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Critical Notice of Richard Moran, Authority and 
Estrangement: An Essay on Self-Knowledge* 
Sebastian Gardner 
There is a way of understanding "the philosophical problem of the self' 
that makes it unquestionably central to and ineliminable from the 
entire endeavor of philosophy, ancient as much as modern: if by asking 
about the self we mean to ask what we really, fundamentally are, then 
the problem of the self comprehends a great range of problems, and 
every philosophical position worth the name will include a theory of 
the self. In analytic philosophy, however, the problem of the self has 
come to be understood differently: what it refers to in the first instance 
is the puzzle presented by knowledge claims regarding one's own psy- 
chological states, a problem that is distinguished from, while enjoying 
some connections with, the problem of the conditions for personal 
identity and the mind-body problem, and that resolves itself into a set 
of finer problems concerning the conditions of psychological self- 
ascription, the reference of the first-person pronoun, the notion of 
immunity to error through misidentification, and so forth. 
In a historical perspective, it is as if the self has ceased to be a lynch- 
pin and become a philosophical epiphenomenon: the self is now 
regarded as presenting a problem whose solution depends substan- 
tially on what positions are taken in other areas of philosophy, and that 
does not play an important or extensive positive role in elucidating 
issues outside the philosophy of mind. The key steps through which 
this shrinking of the concept and problem has come about include of 
course the linguistic turn and Wittgenstein's influential contribution, 
and the move away from Cartesian foundations in epistemology. But 
the decisive factor, it may be ventured, is acceptance, motivated from 
several quarters, of what may be called the Lockean or Strawsonian pic- 
ture, according to which the methodologically and ontologically pri- 
mary item is not the "I" of self-consciousness but the living, concrete, 
empirically determinate person, to which the self is conceived as 
annexed. While it is not denied, on the Lockean picture, that incorpo- 
ration of an "I" is essential to personhood, it is not thought that the "I" 
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as such contains an explanatory ground of personhood or of its philo- 
sophically important dimensions. Problems in, for example, moral psy- 
chology are thus not expected to receive elucidation through 
consideration of the first-person pronoun. In this way the problem of 
the "I" is dissociated from the grand question of what we really and fun- 
damentally are, and a work like Charles Taylor's Sources of the Selfcomes 
to seem, though harmlessly so, inaccurately titled: what Taylor deals 
with in that work is not strictly speaking sources of the self but of per- 
sonhood. 
Richard Moran's endeavor, in this outstanding, stimulating, and 
original book, is to address the analytically circumscribed problem of 
the self in a way that undoes its isolation, restoring to its solution a con- 
nection both with the question of what we really and fundamentally are 
and with moral psychology, by reclaiming the thought that there is 
something "distinctive or irreducible about the perspective of the first- 
person," that "the person's own access and relation to his own mental 
life must be different in its possibilities and limitations from anyone 
else's" (xxviii). In amplifying this idea, Moran breaks with some parts 
of the Lockean-Strawsonian picture. 
Authority and Estrangement takes off from a familiar point, with con- 
sideration of the immediacy, non-inferentiality, and epistemic author- 
ity of claims to self-knowledge. In chapter 1, Moran reviews the 
asymmetries between self-knowledge and knowledge of others, and 
develops an account of self-knowledge that is independent from the 
perceptual model of self-knowledge, which Moran criticizes as defec- 
tive on several fronts and in all its forms. Moran's account retains the 
immediacy affirmed in Descartes's picture while rejecting Descartes's 
(widely supposed) commitment to its infallibility. Moran calls his epis- 
temology "substantialist"-self-knowledge represents a "genuine cog- 
nitive achievement" (3) and "involves the awareness of some 
independently obtaining state of affairs" (17), "truth-conditions [that 
are] in some way independent of the making of the judgment" (18)- 
in contrast with the "deflationist" view that avowals of self-knowledge 
are not "expressive of first-person judgments" (13). On the question of 
whether first-person authority has an a priori basis, a conceptual and 
perhaps normative ground, Moran restricts himself to claiming merely 
that, if it does, then it is not at the cost of making self-knowledge some- 
thing less than genuine cognition, that is, of deflationism or conven- 
tionalism. 
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The further chapters will be considered in some detail later, so here 
I will just state their content briefly. Chapter 2 pursues the argument 
between realism and idealism in the context of the objects of self- 
knowledge. This discussion leads to the central contention of Moran's 
book, developed with depth and brilliance in chapters 3 and 4, con- 
cerning the primacy of the practical in self-knowledge: "It is modelling 
self-consciousness on the theoretical awareness of objects that obscures 
the specifically first-person character of the phenomenon. ... A more 
complete characterization of the first-person perspective will require 
bringing the agent more explicitly into the picture" (32-33). Chapter 
3 does the main work in making good on this claim: beginning with an 
analysis of Moore's paradox, Moran contrasts the theoretical stance 
with that of deliberation and commitment, and explains the notion of 
avowal, as distinct from self-attribution, in terms of the latter. Chapter 
4 maps the ways in which the idea of first-person authority matters, 
showing how it is a condition of having mental states at all (108), how 
it is related to immediacy and to the priority of justificatory over 
explanatory reasons, and how the conditions of self-knowledge are 
connected with psychological health. Chapter 5 returns the discussion 
to the first- and third-person asymmetry that provides Moran's starting 
point, and shows how the preceding analysis allows us to grasp more 
clearly and deeply what it is to be a self, and how this corrects some of 
our ideas about the basic shape of morality. For it is only, Moran con- 
tends, when the first person is properly in focus that we know what it is 
to see oneself as "one person among others". 
Reflecting the dissociation of analytic philosophy's conception of 
the problem of the self from that of earlier modern philosophy, Moran 
concentrates on mapping his relation to contemporary authors and 
dispenses with a historical framework. Passages from Wittgenstein are 
discussed, but in abstraction from what may be considered Wittgen- 
stein's general philosophical intentions. The one figure outside the 
anglophone tradition with whose writings Moran does at several points 
compare his own account of self-knowledge is Sartre: Moran regards 
his own view of self-knowledge as, despite some important differences, 
fundamentally in tune with that which he discovers in Being and Noth- 
ingness. 
Moran's study may be described as epistemology conjoined with 
metaphysics of a descriptive variety, but there are several familiar 
senses in which it counts as conceptual inquiry rather than metaphys- 
ics. First, the considerations that Moran appeals to in arguing for his 
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view are commonsense psychological and phenomenological in the 
nontechnical sense of concerning the appearances of mental life in the 
terms we ordinarily and most readily apply to them (Moran makes 
some use of psychoanalytic ideas, but he belongs to the school that 
regards psychoanalysis as an extension of commonsense psychology). 
Second, Moran does not venture any conceptual innovations or revi- 
sions, and invents no new philosophical concepts: he regards his con- 
clusions as adequately expressible in the terms of our ordinary 
commonsense psychology. Third, there are certain questions about the 
self that Moran does not take up, or, it may be better to say, there are 
certain ways of formulating questions about the self that Moran does 
not employ: What is the self? What is self-consciousness? How is self- 
consciousness possible? Moran's attitude to questions like these, which 
ask after essences or for ultimate grounds and grounding explanations, 
is complex and will be considered below. 
Moran's philosophical picture of the self is intended to match the 
selfs own picture of itself. Moran regards the connection between his 
topic, self-knowledge, and his methodology, adherence to the frame- 
work of commonsense psychology, as internal (34-35). He accepts a 
thesis that one might call "internality of explanation with respect to the 
self," according to which self-knowledge ought to be accounted for in 
the terms of commonsense psychology precisely because the self under- 
stands itself in those terms, and the self is something that ought to be 
explained in the same terms as those in which it understands itself. 
What I will do now is discuss in turn four themes that figure in Moran's 
study: (1) the bearing of sub-personal psychology on understanding of 
the first person, (2) the issue of realism or idealism regarding the 
objects of self-knowledge, (3) Moran's conception of the practical- 
deliberative, and (4) the use made by Moran of Sartre. In each case I 
have some comments to make on the scope of Moran's treatment of 
the topic. These four themes do not by any means exhaust the content 
of the book, and my discussion of them will convey all too little of the 
subtlety of Moran's analyses. The reason for my selection will emerge at 
the end, when I will state the overall view of Moran's achievement that, 
I will suggest, should be extracted from my discussion. 
1. Subpersonal psychologm In order to show how his project sits on a 
larger canvas of contemporary philosophical concerns, Moran situates 
the account that he gives of the self against two opposing positions: the 
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Cartesian conception of the self, and the sub-personalist's view of the 
self. 
While Moran's distance from Cartesianism is straightforward, his 
relation to empirical psychology has complications. Moran regards 
(6ff.) his central theses that self-knowledge is asymmetric with knowl- 
edge of others and that it contains a node of essential interconnection 
with "ordinary rationality and personhood" (8) as contradicting the 
claim that the mind is in reality a configuration of sub-personal struc- 
tures from which the self is absent. In illustration of this claim Moran 
cites Dennett, whose pronouncement that the "new" mind revealed by 
cognitive science shows the Self to be nothing but a species of fiction, 
an idealization or abstraction of some heuristic or practical value but 
lacking empirical reality and thus reality tout court, is well known. 
At one level, however, it is not obvious that there is any inconsistency 
between Moran's theses and even a strong philosophical commitment 
to sub-personal psychology. Suppose Moran's constitutive thesis 
regarding self-consciousness and rationality or personhood is true. It 
follows, the sub-personalist will say, that there is a strongly unified sec- 
tor of psychological life that falls under the rubric of self-knowledge 
and thereby provides prima facie evidence for the existence of a corre- 
sponding configuration at the sub-personal level. The existence of a 
distinctive personal-level sphere does not suggest immediately any 
philosophical limitations on sub-personal analysis; it shows only that 
there is no necessity to pursue the topic of self-knowledge at the sub- 
personal level. To think otherwise would be to conflate Dennett's spe- 
cific, eliminativist-fictionalist sub-personalist thesis with the logical 
implications of sub-personalism perse. Moran is probably right to object 
that Dennett's claim goes beyond what we have reason to believe, but 
if so, the fault lies with Dennett for his extravagant inference, not with 
sub-personalism. 
Moran's underlying worry is that sub-personal theory may be 
claimed to undercut, overtake, or supplant the sort of account that he 
wishes to offer, and he is of course right that there is no guarantee of 
the happy coexistence of a personal-level account of self-knowledge 
with sub-personal analysis: if self-knowledge is open to sub-personal 
analysis, then it is possible that its results will not confirm, or will con- 
tradict, the personal-level view, and in such a case the sub-personalist 
will resort to Dennett's eliminativism-cum-fictionalism. The inconsis- 
tency of Moran's view with sub-personalism thus lies in their respective 
modal claims: Moran wishes to deny, and the sub-personalist to affirm, 
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the possibility of the non-reality of the Self; their difference lies, on one 
conception of supervenience, between denial and affirmation that the 
first-personal sphere supervenes on sub-personal configurations. 
If this is the nature of his disagreement with sub-personalism, Moran 
has the following options: (1) to give grounds for repudiating the very 
idea of sub-personal analysis of the mental in general; (2) to argue, not 
on general terms butjust with reference to the first person, that, should 
sub-personal analysis contradict personal-level understanding, the lat- 
ter must be deemed to survive unscathed; or (3) to leave open the pos- 
sibility that the first-person sphere will be eliminated. Despite some 
suggestion that the normativity built into the first person blocks sub- 
personalization, Moran does not play the general anti-sub-personalist 
card (7 n. 5), so option (1) is not taken. Nor does he say anything to 
support (2) directly: though it may appear somewhat as if Moran 
believes that the degree of internal coherence of the first person gives 
proportional reason to affirm its reality, such an argument would not 
be to the point, and Moran does not make it. That leaves Moran with 
(3), the "fingers crossed" option. Does this matter? It means giving up 
entitlement to claim the autonomous reality of the first-person sphere, 
its nonsupervenience on the sub-personal, but beyond that Moran's 
project is not directly affected: there is nothing to be done about the 
future development of cognitive science, so all that Moran can do is 
what he aims to do anyway, which is to exhibit to a maximal degree the 
distinctiveness, coherence, integrity and importance of first-personal 
understanding. A problem will arise only if incoherences in the first- 
person sphere come to light, for in such circumstances the sub-person- 
alist, whose explanatory project, it should be remembered, is moti- 
vated and underpinned by a positive view of what we fundamentally 
and really are-namely, natural organisms-will be provided with the 
opportunity to cut the Gordian knot by declaring that the philosophi- 
cal puzzles surrounding the "I" have no more cogency than the puzzles 
surrounding qualia, which, Dennett has argued eloquently, are best 
regarded as reflecting the unreality of the pseudo-objects that give rise 
to them. 
There are indications, however, that Moran would not be satisfied 
with option (3) and wants to hold out for a stronger anti-sub-personal- 
ist conclusion (at the very end of the book, for instance, he says that it 
"as a whole has argued that the concept of the person as a reasoning agent 
is ... ineliminable" (193)). And this is understandable, since Moran agrees 
that self-knowledge does exhibit an apparently problematic character 
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and that philosophical labor is demanded to dispel its mystery, and so 
acknowledges the self's vulnerability. First, there is a strong suggestion 
that Moran regards the argument with sub-personalism as engaging a 
proto-axiological, or normative issue. While discussing the implica- 
tions of giving up on first-person authority (121-24), Moran says that 
the "supersession of this assumption, perhaps made possible by some 
future science of the mind" (121), though not entailing any explana- 
tory loss, would shift our picture radically, because "the primary 
thought gaining expression in the idea of 'first-person authority' [is] 
that it is his business what he thinks about something, that it is up to 
him" (123). Moran's view may be, therefore-although the idea is not 
developed explicitly-that the Faktum revealed by awareness of self- 
responsibility expresses an interest of reason sufficiently authoritative 
to deflect sub-personalism. 
Second, and connectedly, Moran seems to put a strong construal on 
the internality of explanation thesis: he considers, as I read him, not 
just that there ought to be some internal explanation of the first per- 
son, but that it ought not to have any external explanation. Again, 
Moran does not say this much explicitly, but commitment to the inter- 
nality of explanation thesis in this strong form would provide a natural 
way of grounding his opposition to sub-personal explanations and elu- 
cidate his sense of their negative import (as it is in evidence on, for 
example, 6-7 and 85-87). However, Moran does not provide general 
support for the internality of explanation thesis strongly construed. 
If Moran's engagement with sub-personal psychology is limited in 
the respects indicated, then his account of the self cannot be claimed 
to have opened up or consolidated a general philosophical position of 
the same sort as that of the Cartesian and sub-personalist. This is to be 
expected, for in order to match sub-personalism, it would be necessary 
for Moran to engage in grounding explanations, specifically, to show 
that the self has-at least, that it can be given, if not that it must be 
given-a grounding explanation that precludes naturalistic sub-per- 
sonalist possibilities. 
2. Realism vs. idealism. In chapter 2, "Making up Your Mind," Moran 
discusses the rival claims of realism and idealism regarding the objects 
of self-knowledge. The question is this: To what extent, if any, is either 
the existence or the character of my psychological states, as known by 
me, dependent upon my awareness (conceptualization, interpreta- 
tion) of them? Moran, concentrating on the case of emotion, acknowl- 
edges that here our intuitions to some degree go two ways. But after 
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teasing out the main factors favoring a realist and an idealist answer to 
the question, he comes down on the side of realism: we need not and 
should not abandon "commonsense," "everyday," "ordinary realism 
about the mental" (37, 59). 
As Moran configures the debate (39-40), there is an initial presump- 
tion in favor of realism: he points out that, after all, we believe that 
there is a fact of the matter regarding one another's psychology, we 
regard self-knowledge as requiring effort (thus supposing there to be 
some fact the would-be self-knower is straining to attain), and there are 
at least some mental (emotional) states whose reality seems to be fixed 
quite independently of how its owner thinks of it. Thus the onus lies, 
per Moran, with the idealist view, of which Moran takes Charles Taylor 
as a representative exponent. On Moran's account, while Taylor's 
hermeneutical claims do pick out many genuine features and peculiar- 
ities of self-understanding, these can be regarded in realist terms once 
the practical-deliberative dimension of self-knowledge is put in place 
(59), and they can be taken to establish idealism only if they are not 
examined closely: Moran thinks that Taylor as it were agglomerates sev- 
eral different respects in which, in some areas of mental life, the iden- 
tity of the state can seem to be determined by how we take or interpret 
it, while ignoring the realist background that makes this limited sphere 
of self-interpretative latitude, and the dynamic-transformative role of 
reflection on one's mental states, possible in the first place. 
Moran's discussion here, while drawing attention to some limita- 
tions of Taylor's articulation of his views, arguably does not work 
through the whole of the issue, and this may be in part because of 
Moran's starting out with the special case of emotion. On the one 
hand, it can seem that emotions provide the right territory for pursu- 
ing the argument between idealism and realism to a definite conclu- 
sion: since emotion appears to grant the most scope for making the 
case for idealism, it would seem that if idealism fails in this context, 
then it can be inferred that it fails in other psychological contexts. 
However, the fact that emotions present special complications also dis- 
tracts from the more fundamental difficulty surrounding the realist 
construal of first-person knowledge, allowing it to be thought that, so 
long as those complications can be shown not to entail idealism, real- 
ism is vindicated. The more fundamental difficulty is whether it is truly 
conceivable that I should regard my psychology as a realm of facts, ones 
with respect to which there are some special possibilities for me, but 
that are fundamentally of a kind with worldly facts at large. If self- 
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knowledge is construed in a plain and unqualifiedly realistic fashion, 
then the subject is obliged to conceive of the world as containing a set 
of facts concerning herself that are of the same order as any other set 
of facts, and that are distinguished for her not in themselves but solely in 
virtue of how she stands in relation to them. This requires the subject to 
operate with a uniform conception of "fact," and to discount the seem- 
ing specialness of the facts that compose her-their seeming to be as it 
were recessed or set apart from the world-as a function of her "take" 
or "angle" on them. 
Idealism, as a general philosophical position, can account for this sit- 
uation in terms of its being a requirement on objective facticity, on the 
formation or application of the very concept of an objective fact, that 
it should stand in contrast with a subjective field: the objects of self- 
knowledge cannot be homogenized with the facts that compose objec- 
tive reality at large, the idealist will say, because the latter are depen- 
dent (in a sense that goes beyond mere temporal epistemic order) on 
the former. From the same idealist quarters, the objection can also be 
put that a conception of fact that allows itself to be stretched in the way 
required by the realist cannot be taken for granted: if "real" states of 
affairs allow of modes of presentation and of epistemic access as 
remarkable as those exhibited in the first person, then no ordinary, 
humdrum, common-or-garden conception of reality is in play, and the 
realist is under pressure to first explain what this conception is and 
whence derives his entitlement to it. 
Holding aside counterarguments deriving from a general idealism, 
it is true that there is no contradiction in the realist supposition that 
the seeming specialness of the objects of self-knowledge is a perspec- 
tival function, residing solely in the subject's relation to them. But to 
say this raises the question, What is the subject's own, positive concep- 
tion of this relation? In order to adhere to the internality of explana- 
tion thesis, the conception must be one such as does or could appear 
on the inside of the subject, notjust a conception fashioned by some- 
one occupying the sideways-on view: it needs to be a way of thinking 
that is or can be exercised by the subject in her relating herself to her 
mental states. What then is this relation? Viewed one way, it seems that 
I have no positive conception of it: I cannot tell a story of how I come 
to stand in relation to my mental life; the only account I can give of the 
relation is exhausted in my ability to reflectively relate myself to my 
states. If this is so, then I cannot discount-at least, I cannot do so from the 
inside-the "seeming of specialness" of the objects of self-knowledge in 
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the way required by the realist: I cannot subtract my "take" on the facts 
that compose me from the facts themselves, if I do not have a concep- 
tion of what it is that I am supposed to subtract.1 
That there is a deep difficulty with the idea that the seeming special- 
ness of the objects of self-knowledge is contained in a relation to them, 
rather than residing in the objects themselves, is in fact a line of 
thought pursued by Moran himself, in criticism of D. H. Mellor's 
account of conscious belief (28-33). But Moran does not regard the 
point as unsettling his ordinary realism: his claim, if I read him cor- 
rectly, is that the practical-deliberative dimension of self-knowledge 
solves the difficulty without impugning realism. Whether it can play 
this role, I argue below, is doubtful. 
That said, even if Moran's notion of the practical-deliberative does 
not free his realism from difficulty, it certainly does not follow that ide- 
alism of any old sort gives the correct account of the matter at hand. On 
the contrary, and in conformity with the considerations cited by Moran 
as creating a presumption in favor of realism, the difficulty just indi- 
cated for realism reappears for idealism, under the construal that 
Moran gives it and supposes is to be found in Taylor: a conception of 
self-knowing along the lines of "I constitute myself thus," "I make it so 
that I am thus"-a hermeneutically creative conception of my relation 
to the objects of self-knowledge, whereby interpretation is logically suf- 
ficient for one's states (43), so that the objects of self-knowledge come 
to resemble products or instances of agency in the ordinary sense- 
clearly cannot play the requisite internal role. Idealism, so construed, 
is merely the obverse of realism, and accordingly mirrors its difficulty. 
With regard to his criticism of Taylor, what Moran has arguably not 
factored in is Taylor's intention to address in his idealist account of the 
objects of self-knowledge precisely the "transcendental" question that 
Moran puts into the margin by committing himself to "ordinary real- 
ism" in the domain of self-knowledge-the question of how there 
comes to be in the first place such a thing as persons, of how beings of 
our deeply peculiar sort can ever arise. Taylor may, therefore, agree 
with Moran that discussion of the relevant features of emotion does 
not, taken in isolation, warrant an inference to idealism, but add that 
his intention was instead to assign to his discussion of emotion a sub- 
ordinate place in his attempt to construct an answer to a question that 
does not figure on Moran's agenda. 
The conclusion thus far would appear to be that Moran's discussion has 
not settled the issue in favor of realism, and that our two sets of intuitions 
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remain unreconciled. The sub-personalist naturalist may propose dis- 
solving the conflict of intuitions by treating the sphere of self-under- 
standing, as Dennett proposes, on an analogy with a fictional world. A 
diametrically opposed suggestion is to be found in Sartre. The hope for 
Moran, who does not take over Sartre's metaphysics, must be that his 
conception of the practical-deliberative dimension will be able to 
accommodate the idealist intuition, that is, explain the seeming spe- 
cialness of the objects of self-knowledge in a way that is compatible with 
ordinary realism about them. 
3. The practical-deliberative Moran's concept of the practical-deliber- 
ative dimension of self-awareness is supposed to account for the fea- 
tures of self-knowledge neglected or misunderstood by other theories 
of self-knowledge. 
Moran's thesis that the basic form of self-knowledge is practical 
(stated at many points in the book (e.g., 150-51)) means that our hav- 
ing knowledge of ourselves consists in a practically or deliberatively ori- 
ented taking-up of our psychological states: consciousness of our 
attitudes is constituted by our interest in believing what is true, desiring 
what is desirable, etc., and our capacity for deliberating about those 
matters. Fundamentally, our relation to our psychological states is 
practical in the sense of doing something to our states, where this 
"doing" is conceived dispositionally or capacitationally: our "capacity 
for avowal" constitutes the fundamental relation of self-knowledge. In 
order for this capacity to render the relation practical in a significant 
sense, avowal must mean more than "make it be known," and Moran 
uses a variety of expressions to evoke the non-epistemological, quasi- 
conative dimension that he wants to fix: "endorse," "commit to," "speak 
for," "identify with," "acknowledge," "take responsibility for," "assume 
authority for," "see as 'up to me' " (xx). These are the marks of avowal 
as distinct from mere self-attribution. The reflexive stance or posture 
that Moran has in mind is therefore more fundamental than the sorts 
of reflexive practical attitudes exhibited more conspicuously in "sec- 
ond-order" psychological states such as resistance to one's evil 
impulses. 
The index of being related to one's psychological states in the mode 
of endorsement or commitment is satisfaction of what Moran calls the 
"Transparency Condition," which is the condition that a piece of self- 
knowledge meets when its avowal-the affirmative judgment that p is 
as a matter of fact one's psychological state-is in tune with what is 
claimed by p, with what p says about the world or with what is needed 
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in order for p to be rational and justified. Failure to meet this condition 
is a mark of self-alienation of some sort and to some degree. Thus in 
the case of belief, Moore's paradox is an index of failure to meet the 
Transparency Condition. Transparency is, on Moran's account, not a 
"logical requirement" but an "achievement" due to the practical-delib- 
erative stance (6-7). 
As an analysis of self-knowledge competing with others on offer, 
Moran's account is extremely impressive, and its strengths are detailed 
convincingly in the book. It raises however a question connected with 
the issues discussed earlier. 
Moran holds that it is the "practical point of view" on ourselves that 
secures our rootedness in ourselves and makes that relation asymmet- 
ric with our relation to others. One way that he goes about trying to 
show this is to invite us to conceive a subject that relates to its psycho- 
logical life in a purely theoretical, cognitive mode (90ff). Moran argues 
persuasively that such a case, however complete and accurate the self- 
knowledge achieved by such a subject, would be one of "mind-reading" 
one's own mind, "self-telepathy," and not an instance of the "ordinary 
relation of self-knowledge"; the subject would be locked into the self- 
alienation evinced in Moore's paradox. Thus, Moran infers, it is the 
practical dimension that grounds our rootedness in ourselves. 
Now this makes it look rather as if Moran is analyzing self-knowledge 
as a product of independent factors-as if he is inferring, from our dis- 
covery that a purely theoretical self-relation is insufficient for the ordi- 
nary relation of self-knowledge, that this relation must be practical; as 
if the idea were that it is because this psychological series is the one that 
I can do something about (or with, or to) and so must take responsibility 
for, that it is genuinely mine, that I am not distant from it in the manner 
of a mind-reader. 
The notion that the bridge between the self as (knowing) "subject" 
and the self as (known) "object" consists of a practical tie is appealing, 
but it is important to recognize the explanatory limitation of the idea. 
In the first place, Moran's thought-experiment does not allow it to be 
inferred that the practical self-relation accounts for our rootedness in 
ourselves. The fact that if the practical self-relation is subtracted we no 
longer have self-knowledge does not mean that the practical self-rela- 
tion is the source, the explanation, of what distinguishes self-knowledge 
from knowledge of others. For it may also be inferred from the fact that 
self-knowledge is destroyed by subtraction of the practical self-relation 
that the practical self-relation is a necessary consequence of whatever it is 
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that makes self-knowledge what it is: there may be something as yet uni- 
dentified that is the ground of both the theoretical and practical self- 
relations and that necessitates both. Also, and importantly, a circularity 
looms. The practical self-relation cannot coherently be added in 
thought, as supervening, to a pre-existing merely theoretical self-rela- 
tion, since the subject of the practical self-relation (the "I" that 
endorses, commits itself, identifies) must identify the stretch of psycho- 
logical life that it is its job to take responsibility for as its own, must 
already conceive it as a unity to which it relates as itself, and so must 
already be presented with the objects of self-knowledge in just the way 
that the practical self-relation was intended to elucidate. 
A limit is thus set to the practical as an explanation of self-knowl- 
edge. Moran can claim that the practical self-relation is necessary for 
self-knowledge, and that it is a symptom or expression of whatever it is 
that explains self-knowledge, but not that it is what grounds our root- 
edness in ourselves, that avowal "is what makes the difference" between 
self-awareness and awareness of others (107). 
Insofar as Moran's project is not directed at uncovering explanatory 
grounds but rather at mapping conceptual connections, this is no 
point against him, but it has an important implication for an earlier 
issue: it means that the practical self-relation cannot be claimed to 
account for the seeming specialness of the objects of self-knowledge, 
and so cannot be employed to free Moran's ordinary realism from the 
difficulty described earlier. There is, moreover, a respect in which the 
practical self-relation seems to highlight the difficulty encountered by 
Moran's realism. If, as realism implies, the objects of self-knowledge 
have a real existence that extends beyond their being avowed and iden- 
tified with, how do they come to present themselves as practically ame- 
nable, as occasions for deliberation, as surrounded with practical 
possibilities? How, once I have grasped something as a fact about me, 
can I go on to grasp it as "practicable" in the special way that Moran 
quite rightly says distinguishes the objects of self-knowledge? In the 
case of things composing the not-self, there is no conceptual difficulty 
in seeing how they can be the objects of both theoretical and practical 
attitudes-I see this is a hammer and I mean to pick it up-because a 
subject to whom we ascribe the capacity to unify the two perspectives is 
presupposed, but the existence of an entity with this capacity cannot be 
accounted for by modeling the subject's relation to inner objects on its 
relation to outer objects. There must be, it seems, something within or 
about the facts composing the objects of self-knowledge that makes 
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possible and elicits their being taken up practically (avowed, endorsed, 
committed-to, etc.), but whatever this might be, its compatibility with 
ordinary realism remains undemonstrated and in doubt. (The ques- 
tion of how something presented as a fact becomes practicable can, of 
course, also be put in reverse: how does an object intended in practical 
self-determining become a fact to which ordinary realism is appropri- 
ate?) 
Moran might simply regard the transcendental question that has 
surfaced here, concerning the intrasubjective unity of the practical and 
the theoretical moments of self-consciousness, as falling outside the 
bounds of his inquiry, albeit at the cost of leaving it unclear how a prac- 
tical relation to the objects of self-knowledge can be squared with real- 
ism. Yet Moran does appear to take up the challenge of explaining the 
practical-theoretical unity: first, by disputing George Rey's sub-person- 
alist explanation of how the theoretical and practical dimensions slot 
together (85ff.), and second, by adverting to the empirical/transcen- 
dental distinction in Kant and Sartre in order to gloss his dual perspec- 
tives (e.g., 89). Even if Moran is right that Rey's account is inadequate 
(though Moran's argument against Rey seems to me again to underes- 
timate the possibilities of sub-personal explanation), this still leaves 
him without a positive account of his own. The comparison with Kant 
and Sartre seems to break down quickly. The transcendental point of 
view in Kant is not a point of view occupied by empirical subjects in 
their dealings with empirical objects, but a strictly philosophical view, 
designed to explain what makes it possible for us to inhabit our empir- 
ical point of view, while the dual-perspective element in Kant's system 
that does to some degree parallel Moran, the theory of freedom, for 
obvious reasons cannot be the model that Moran is intending to follow. 
The element in Sartre's system that again has some parallel with 
Moran's doubling of perspectives, Sartre's facticity/transcendence dis- 
tinction, implies however, I argue below, a view of self-knowledge that 
conflicts with Moran's realism, and part of the reason for this is that 
Sartre's distinction-which should not be assimilated to either Kant's 
empirical/transcendental distinction or his theoretical/practical dis- 
tinction-has an ontological sense and is not just a distinction of per- 
spectives or "stances." 
4. Sartre. Moran's comparison of his account with Sartre's view that 
the sphere of self-consciousness is one of freedom and responsibility is 
obviouslyjustified, but there is a key difference, which goes back to the 
realism vs. idealism issue. 
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Moran holds that the tension between realism and idealism regard- 
ing the objects of self-knowledge is a tension in philosophical reflection, 
from which it can be eliminated through an account that gives a proper 
place to the practical-deliberative dimension: the realism- and ideal- 
ism-suggestive dimensions of self-knowledge are balanced out, the 
former weighing more heavily. Sartre, by contrast, holds that the ten- 
sion is internal to natural consciousness, and that it must be preserved, 
in an appropriately elucidated form, in philosophical theory, precisely 
in order for that theory to uphold the self-responsibility of first-person 
understanding. The reason why Sartre's position is not a mere restate- 
ment of the idealist-plus-realist confusion that inhabits natural con- 
sciousness, but rather a philosophical explanation of it, is that his 
account of the objects of self-knowledge is metaphysical: on Sartre's 
account, the "idealist" and "realist" aspects of the objects of self-knowl- 
edge are written into their ontological status. Moran's difference from 
Sartre emerges sharply in a discussion on 79-80, where Moran treats as 
contingent-as peculiar to cases of self-alienation-a structure that 
Sartre regards as inherent in self-knowledge as such, and the same pat- 
tern is repeated in Moran's discussion of intersubjectivity in chapter 5: 
Sartre regards the general form of the self's relation with others as 
problematic in a way that Moran denies (Moran's view of intersubjec- 
tivity is, in Sartre's language, "ontological optimism"). 
It is notable that, although the metaphysics employed by Sartre do 
not support what Moran calls an "ordinary realism" about the mental, 
they are not contradicted by the considerations cited by Moran as cre- 
ating a presumption in favor of ordinary realism, and nor is Sartre's 
position objectionable in the way that Moran supposes the idealism to 
which he opposes his own realism to be. First, while Moran is surely 
right to insist in his critique of the idealist theory that there is in self- 
knowledge a purposeful striving-self-knowing is conducted under an 
aegis, with an end in view, in relation to which the endeavor can fail or 
succeed-and that this end is not captured by talking of self-creation, 
it remains possible that the telos does not require the real existence of 
psychological facts: Moran's considerations preclude only what one 
might call an "ordinary idealism" about the mental, leaving it open that 
some other, "non-ordinary" form of idealism can articulate the telos of 
self-knowledge, and Sartre has a great deal to say on that subject. 
Second, regarding Moran's (again,justified) insistence that an account 
of self-knowledge must allow the attempt to know oneself to "terminate in 
a true description" (63), Sartre agrees that there is "termination" in one 
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sense - a point can be reached where all the factual considerations 
have been counted in. The question, Sartre insists, while agreeing with 
Moran that "deflationism" is not the answer, is what sort of thing is 
determined at this point and whether the terminus should be con- 
ceived as knowledge of an "ordinarily real" fact. Whereas Moran 
answers in the affirmative, according to Sartre, to represent the termi- 
nus of self-knowing as an ordinarily real fact is to lose sight of its non- 
ordinary mode of being and so of the necessary condition of self- 
responsibility. 
Let me now say where I think the discussion leads. As has been seen, 
there are a number of questions concerning the self raised by Moran's 
account that are either not addressed by him or to which, if the 
demand for explanation is pressed far enough, his answer appears 
incomplete. These include the justification for affirming the impene- 
trability of the first-person sphere to sub-personalist naturalistic expla- 
nation or elimination, the explanation for the seeming specialness of 
the objects of self-knowledge, and the unity of the theoretical and the 
practical dimensions of self-consciousness. To the extent that Moran's 
inquiry is circumscribed in such a way that these issues fall outside its 
bounds, this is no shortfalling, and I have taken pains to emphasize that 
the extended analysis that provides the core of Authority and Estrange- 
ment is unaffected by the points I have raised. However, Moran's atti- 
tude to the transcendental questions is, we have also seen, tinged with 
ambiguity. On the one hand, as said at the outset, Moran can be viewed 
as pursuing conceptual inquiry in a sense that contrasts with metaphys- 
ical explanation, while on the other hand, engagement with metaphys- 
ical issues is implied by the various claims of his discussed above. 
Indeed, embedding of his analysis of self-knowledge in a bigger picture 
seems to be part of what Moran has intended to add in expanding his 
journal papers into a book. 
The metaphysical issues must be faced eventually in any case, and 
what merits emphasis at this point, I suggest, is the strength of the case 
for supposing that, in order for them to be resolved in a way that 
coheres with Moran's central theses concerning self-knowledge, spec- 
ulative metaphysics of a sort that Moran avoids are needed. 
This point begins to emerge from consideration of the difference 
between Moran and Sartre. The relevant question is not whether Sartre 
is right to suppose that an ontologically grounded libertarianism is nec- 
essary for human responsibility, but whether the way in which philo- 
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sophical consideration of the self provides a basic or primafacie warrant 
for the sort of approach adopted by Sartre. In favor of supposing that 
the answer is yes, the following can be said immediately. First, Sartre's 
introduction of different modes of being responds directly to the pres- 
sure exerted by the basic insight that I do not relate to the objects of 
self-knowledge as to worldly states of affairs: the reason why our rela- 
tions to each sphere are so different, and why their epistemologies dif- 
fer, is that they have the different modes of being theorized by Sartre. 
Second, the very same thesis allows Sartre to address the puzzle of 
Moran's conception of the practical-deliberative: the mode of being of 
the objects of self-knowledge precludes discrimination within them of 
two moments, one factual and one practical, so the problem of their 
"becoming practicable" does not arise. Third, and in one respect this is 
the most important point, Sartre's anti-naturalistic metaphysics 
achieves directly the aim of insulating the first-person sphere from sub- 
personal explanation. 
To emphasize, the present question is not whether Sartre's meta- 
physics succeed or fail. Sartre is but one instance in a long tradition of 
post-Kantian speculation, and the point at issue is whether this tradi- 
tion should be treated merely as an ancillary resource, from which 
ideas can be selected in piecemeal fashion to corroborate insights 
achieved through other, non-speculative philosophical means, or 
whether it should be regarded, as has been argued on many occasions 
by Dieter Henrich, as a unified philosophical program with enduring 
value that lies open to recovery and future development.2 To take the 
latter view is to be presented with a wide range of possibilities, all of 
which reject, in a way more radical than Moran, the Lockean-Strawso- 
nian picture, in favor of the idea that self-consciousness is metaphysi- 
cally and methodologically foundational. They thus qualify, from the 
standpoint of ordinary realism, as varieties of idealism (though of a 
non-ordinary sort, which can claim to be also in some sense realistic). 
One way of stating the difference between this approach and Moran's 
is to say that, from the perspective of the former, the internality of 
explanation thesis has been applied by Moran only halfway, reflecting 
his continued, partial adherence to the Lockean-Strawsonian picture: 
Moran has given a view of self-knowledge that is internal with respect to 
commonsense psychology, but not with respect to subjectivity as such, and 
this is why the explanatory and grounding dimensions of his account 
are limited. In order to provide a view of the self that is fully internal 
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and comes closer to explanatory completeness, a philosophical step 
outside the bounds of commonsense psychology is needed. 
From where many of those who find Moran's conclusions appealing 
stand, the attempt to reclaim philosophical interest for systems of this 
idealist sort is an attempt to unlearn decisive lessons from the history of 
philosophy, and to abandon the hard labor of elucidating and defend- 
ing the reality of the personal sphere without resort to the quick fix of 
speculative metaphysics. What I have wanted to suggest is that, what- 
ever else may be wrong with the post-Kantian project (and it is not, I 
think Moran would agree (xxxiv), that it is "Cartesian"), thisjudgment 
is not supported by consideration of the dimensions of self-conscious- 
ness that Moran brings to light. Viewed from inside the post-Kantian 
tradition, Moran's achievement, in attempting to develop his insight 
into the problem of the self within the analytic frame of reference, is to 
have pushed that framework, not to a point of collapse, but to a point 
from which the post-Kantian alternative returns to view. 
One final comment, on a point connected with the issue of philo- 
sophical traditions. The implication, and in some ways also the assump- 
tion, of Moran's inquiry is that Transparency as such is a good, a 
necessary and proper goal, and that its absence, Alienation, is a defi- 
ciency or deprivation, to be overcome. Moran does not say anything as 
crude as this, but some such outlook orients much of his discussion: 
Transparency is connected directly and firmly to rational personhood, 
and when Moran gives examples of its failure, these are all cases that, 
everyone would agree, call for its restoration. Thus, in his (fascinating) 
treatment in chapter 5 of how the attempt to know oneself can mis- 
carry, Moran explains the cases that he considers in terms of a false 
assimilation of self-knowledge to theoretical knowledge, or of the first 
person to the third. Moran does not see any inherent limitations to the 
project of self-avowal. 
Now one might ask whether this is the whole story. One might think, 
first, that the demands of personal relationships, or of psychological 
flourishing, can provide not just psychological barriers to Transpar- 
ency but reasons for setting limits to its scope. Second, there are philo- 
sophical and religious views from which again it would follow that 
Transparency is in certain domains an abortive or misguided 
endeavor. Should either prove to be so, then there are elements in and 
of the self with respect to which avowability in Moran's sense is not 
proper-objects of self-knowledge that I should not, of course, disavow 
in the sense of counting them into the not-self, but that equally I 
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should not strive to avow in the sense of "committing" myself to them. 
These objects I should regard not as "up to me" but as transcending the 
scope of what is properly subject to my deliberation.3 Obviously, and 
yet again, to raise this possibility is to make no criticism as such of 
Moran, who is of course quite right that with regard to the sectors of 
psychological life that he has in his sights, Transparency is what is 
wanted. What is indicated instead is that Moran's outlook is not insu- 
lated from questions about the scope and meaning of rationality that 
the philosophy of mind on its own cannot settle, and that there are 
some conceptions of rationality that would require his account to be 
extended in a way that would allow "benign" or "rational" non-Trans- 
parency to be discriminated from its malign or irrational forms. As 
Moran recognizes when he aligns his view with the "tradition of Reflec- 
tion" represented by Kant (138ff.), Authority and Estrangement is written 
in the spirit of Enlightenment. As such, it has its Counter-Enlighten- 
ment critics, some of whom can also claim Kantian ancestry. That a 
short book, on a topic that often seems to occupy only a small, techni- 
cal corner in the philosophy of mind, should touch and illuminate so 
many nerve centers of philosophical concern, is cause for great admi- 
ration. 
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